Iraq
Imam Ali bin Abi Talib
“O’ people of Iraq,
I have hated you and you have hated me. I have loathed you and you
have loathed me. May Allah give me a better people, and may He give
you a worst ruler.” – Imam Ali bin Abi Talib, addressing Iraqis.
“I have won, by the God of the Kaaba!” – Ali bin
Abi Talib, when he was stabbed to death in the Kufa Mosque, Iraq.
“May ugliness and grief befall you.
You have become objects. You are invaded, but you do not invade. You
are plundered, but you do not plunder. Allah is disobeyed, yet you
are content. If I order you to deploy against them during the days
of heat, you say, ‘This is the worst of the heat. Give us time until
it is over.’ And if I order you to deploy against them in the
winter, you say, ‘This is the season of bitter cold. Give us time
until the cold has been shed.’ All of this to flee from heat and
cold. If you flee from heat and cold, then, by Allah, you will flee
even more from the sword. O’ you semblance of men - not men - with
the intelligence of children and the wits of anklet bearers, I wish
I had not seen you nor known you. By Allah, knowing you has brought
about shame and resulted in repentance. May Allah fight you. You
have filled my heart with pus and loaded my chest with rage. You
have made me drink one mouthful of grief after another. You have
corrupted my counsel with your disobedience and abandonment.” –
Imam
Ali bin Abi Talib, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, and founder
of Shi’ite Islam, addressing Iraqis.

Saturday, 11 August 2007
THE FEDERAL STATE OF IRAQ
Sanger
Jamal Sulaimaniyah
beauticians in demand July 19, 2006
Without no Islamic militants to threaten them, beauty salons in the Kurdish
north are attracting droves of customers.
By Sanger Jamal in Sulaimaniyah
Fahima Sleman left her job as a beauty salon manager in Baghdad eight months
ago, after six similar shops in the same al-Adil neighbourhood were bombed out
by insurgents.
The 37-year-old hairdresser relocated to the Kurdish city of Sulaimaniyah,
known as the safest in Iraq, where she found work at a hairdresser's shop.
Although her family is moving to Syria to escape the sectarian violence now
commonplace in other parts of Iraq, Sleman is planning to stay in Sulaimaniyah,
where she reckons she can survive on her wage of 350 US dollars a month.
Security and economic growth have created a boom in the beauty business in
Sulaimaniyah, in contrast to the rest of the country where Islamic extremists
see such shops as dens of iniquity to be attacked. There are now close to 450
salons operating, which industry observers say represents a big increase on
2003, although there are no comparative figures.
The industry has also been fuelled by the increased earning power of women,
who hold many of the civil service jobs in a public sector that is the largest
employer in Iraqi Kurdistan.
While the salaries are miniscule, women are willing to shell out cash to have
their hair, make-up and nails done.
Lanja Ibrahim, a 25-year-old civil servant, makes only 164,000 dinar (about
110 dollars) a month but goes to the salon twice monthly to have her hair cut,
dyed or styled. She hates the fact that she has to wait, even when she has
made an appointment.
"Visiting the salon feels like going to a medical clinic," she said. "I have
to wait at least an hour every time."
Ibrahim also doesn't like the price. She pays about 13,500 dinar (nine
dollars) to have her hair cut and dyed black - but she said that she and other
women are more willing to invest in "taking care of ourselves, as well as
following the latest fashions".
Women are in fact more likely to complain about prices than they are to
express concerns about salons being attacked in Sulaimaniyah, even though
hairdressers here have faced threats in the past.
In 1993, Nashmeel Mohammad received an anonymous threatening letter against
the hairdressing business she ran in her home. Then her house was hit by a
hand-grenade. Mohammad, who has worked in the business for over two decades,
accused Islamists of being behind the attack and refused to quit her work.
Osman said that since 2000, there have been three cases of attacks against
salons. In the 1990s, she said, the rate of attacks was much higher. Radical
Islamists tried to gain control of Sulaimaniyah and surrounding areas then but
have little presence now.
One of the most modern hair and beauty salons is Style Centre, which is run by
beauticians and hairdressers from the rest of the country. Dhiya' abdul-Sattar,
a manager at the centre, said it has about 50 customers a day and charges
upwards of 125,000 dinar (about 85 dollars) for brides getting their hair and
make-up done.
The centre is also one of many salons that have men doing hair and make-up.
This was a taboo just a few years ago in Sulaimaniyah and is rarely seen in
many parts of the country, according to Osman.
Abdul-Sattar employs four men and one woman in his salon and said it hasn't
caused any problems.
"It's normal to have men do our customers' make-up," he said. "Many [female
customers] even demand that the male employees do their make-up and cut their
hair."
Sanger Jamal
Gertrude Bell and the Birth of Iraq
Chris Calder
2004
America has its Founding Fathers; the modern nation of Iraq has a
peculiar kind of Founding Mother.
Or maybe she was a national nanny. For Iraq's Founding ... Someone
... was not Iraqi, but a red-haired, Oxford-educated mountaineer, an
honored poet and opponent to suffragettes, an Arabist and proud British
imperialist named Gertrude Bell.
Gertrude Bell designed — literally drew onto the map — the country
that America is now trying to (perfectly Orwellian term) "rebuild." She
did so via her mastery of Arabic, Persian and Turkish; her deep
knowledge of the Arab tribes and friendships with their sheiks; through
the immense influence she carried with the leadership of the British
Empire.
She was one of the world's most powerful women at the beginning of
the 20th century, a key shaper of the version of the Middle East over
which our soldiers are killing and dying, for us, right now.
Even that brief, incomplete resume hints at why Bell's name rarely
makes the feminist pantheon. But why the mention of Gertrude Bell or of
the West's first invasion of Iraq is so rare these days is harder to
understand.
Though maybe, in this age of the Memory Hole, not.
* * *
Gertrude Bell crossed Arabia when that land was largely a blank patch
on Europe's maps. She traveled alone, it's said, but that's not counting
the train of servants, from cooks to armed guards to muleteers, all
Arab, who followed her across the desert over more than a decade. Miss
Bell, as she was known formally for her 58 years, dined on china even
when she traveled by camel. And she always sent for the latest fashions
from London even after she had lived as Khatun, a particular kind of
great lady, in Baghdad for many years.
Bell very genuinely fell in love with the people of Arabia. (When she
first visited the area, the land was a set of vilayets, or provinces of
the Ottoman Empire). Bell's fascination and affection were returned, and
she received a warm welcome from people who might have shot a lone male
British explorer.
Bell's biographer, Janet Wallach, recounts the first journey Bell
took from Jerusalem to Damascus in 1900: "In the heart of the mountains
called the Jebel Druze, she rode through one tiny village after another,
causing a stir as she passed the white-turbaned, black-robed men. At
Miyemir she stopped to water her horse. The veiled women, dressed in
their long blue and red robes, were filling their earthenware jugs,
dipping them into the pool. Gertrude dismounted, and a young man about
19 approached; like all the Druze men and women, he had outlined his
enormous eyes in black kohl. The beautiful boy took her hands, and, to
her surprise, kissed her on both her cheeks. Other men followed, shaking
her hand, eager to inspect the stranger."
Bell was hooked, it was clear, when she wrote at the end of her trip
from Damascus, "with the desert almost up to its gates, and the breath
of it blowing in with every wind, and the spirit of it passing in
through the city gates with every Arab camel driver. That is the heart
of the whole matter."
Six times over the next 12 years, Bell rode across Arabia, until she
knew the doings of the sheiks better than those of British society. She
became a renowned figure among the tribes, a Person, she liked to say.
She got to know the intricacies of their alliances and rivalries:
"For the moment, at least, the Beni Shakr were her friends. Five
years earlier they had called her a "daughter of the desert." Now, as
she lunched in her tent, enjoying a meal of curry served on fine china,
washing it down with a glass of wine, one of the Beni Shakr joined her,
and they sat together, drinking coffee, smoking her Egyptian cigarettes,
and talking of the bloodthirsty Druze. At nightfall the desert turned
cold and wet; she wrapped herself in her fur, slipped a hot water bottle
between her sheets, and went to bed."
A few days later Bell visits the very same Druze at their desert
castle and finds them readying for battle against the Beni Shakr, whose
tents she has just left.
"One (Druze fighter) noticed Gertrude. He strode up and raised his
sword above his head. 'Lady!,' he cried, 'the English and the Druze are
one'."
"'Thank God!,' she answered, 'We too are a fighting race'."
* * *
In 1914, the British indeed brought war to Mesopotamia. From their
long-held (since the 17th century) base in Basra, they sent an army
north along the Euphrates River toward Baghdad. But here's where things
stop looking like an old Imperial expedition and more like the nightmare
battlefield of the 20th century. Over three months, the British lost
25,000 men during a siege at Kut. It was, at the height of British
power, the nation's biggest military disaster to that time.
Iraq was a battleground in the First World War for one reason.
As Wallach describes the British position at the beginning of the
war, their "unrivaled navy delivered goods around the world and brought
home three-quarters of (the country's) food supply. To maintain its
superiority, in 1911 the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill,
had ordered a major change, switching the nation's battleships from
coal-burning engines to oil. Far superior to the traditional ships,
these new oil-burning vessels could travel faster, cover a greater range,
and be refueled at sea; what's more, their crews would not be exhausted
by having to refuel, and would require less manpower."
Wallach continues, "Britain had been the world's leading provider of
coal, but she had no oil of her own. In 1912, Churchill signed an
agreement for a major share in the Anglo-Persian oil company, with its
oil wells in southern Persia and refineries at Abadan, close to Basra.
It was essential for Britain to protect that vital area..."
* * *
Unlike the American invasion 90 years later, the British drive to
Baghdad was slow and excruciating. But after three months they captured
the city and for a while things were calm, especially when compared to
Baghdad today. Gertrude Bell, for instance, was given the title "Oriental
Secretary" to the British government three months after the invasion
ended. She rode her horse alone along the banks of the Euphrates River
each morning at 6am before dressing for work.
At the office, she met with an endless stream of sheiks and religious
leaders. Relying on her decade-plus experience in the desert, she
discovered from these men, always men, their views about the future of
the country, their needs, the needs of their people, and reported all to
the British High Commissioner.
But the British either wouldn't or couldn't put together an Iraqi
government. In truth, they weren't totally convinced they wanted to
sponsor an Iraqi state at all. Churchill favored letting most of Iraq
go, fortifying only the oil fields near Basra.
A year and a half went by under British military rule before the
tribes along the Euphrates rebelled. In a town called Dair, British
soldiers arrested the mayor. The townspeople, Wallach writes, "blew up
the oil dump, wounding 90 people, released all the prisoners from the
jail and attacked the British army barracks. When the Political Officer
tried to make peace in the town, the sheiks attacked him in a fury. Just
as they were about to kill him, two British airplanes flew overhead,
spraying the town with machine-gun fire."
Iraq was Britain's testing ground for the use of aircraft against
guerrilla fighters and their villages (another of Churchill's pet ideas).
The British spent the 1920s, 30s, 40s and most of the 50s bombing and
strafing desert outposts in Iraq. What does it say about the nature of
progress that Britain and the US spent the 1990s doing essentially the
same thing?
* * *
Examining Britain's occupation of Iraq for clues to the future of
America's is a murky prospect. One interesting detail, though, is that a
couple of years after Britain's occupation began, the British public
rebelled against the cost of the war. Officials started looking for ways
to cut costs quickly. Churchill (again Churchill) called a conference in
Cairo, inviting 40 experts on Mesopotamia: 39 men and Gertrude Bell.
Many officials wanted to pull out of Mesopotamia altogether, except
for the Persian Gulf. Bell and a few others, like T.E. Lawrence, argued
for making and backing an Arab kingdom in Iraq. Bell's party eventually
persuaded Churchill that Arab monarchies with British power behind them
would make for a more stable region, cheaper in the long run as a
provider of oil.
After the Cairo Conference, according to Wallach, "almost everything
(Bell) had wished for now had a chance of coming true. The country would
consist of all three vilayets — Baghdad, Basra and Mosul; the Sunnis,
Shiites, Jews, Christians and Kurds would be united under a Sharifian
king; and Iraq, rich, prosperous and led by Faisal, would be a loyal
protégé of Britain. If Gertrude could bring it all off, it would be more
than interesting, it would be a model for the entire Middle East."
* * *
Back in Iraq, "model for the entire Middle East," British soldiers
were putting down the rebellion, killing an estimated 10,000 Iraqis.
Most towns went again under British control; those which didn't were
razed with explosives. But the Iraqi resistance would not die, until the
British were driven out more than 30 years later.
Furthering its plan to establish Arab kingdoms, Britain chose the
sons of Sharif Hussein, Faisal and Abdullah, to be its native allies in
the Middle East. Faisal was put on a throne in Damascus and crowned
ruler of "Greater Syria." Abdullah was crowned king of Transjordan.
The Arab government in Damascus lasted just under two years. (Jordan
exists to this day, with Abdullah's great grandson on the throne.) But
in 1921, the French kicked out Faisal's administration. Presented with
an out-of-work king (Faisal) and a country dangerously adrift (Iraq),
the British decided to put the two together. They organized a long,
public processional for Faisal from Basra to Baghdad, hoping that by the
time the tour was completed, Faisal would generate enough excitement
among the public to allow the British to crown him "by acclamation" and
get away with it.
Once again, Gertrude Bell was in the thick of the plans. She attached
herself as advisor to Faisal and oversaw everything from the daily round
of appointments to the furnishings of the new royal palace in Baghdad.
* * *
The wrench in Britain's plans was named Ibn Saud. A powerful
chieftain who had also been in the pay of the British for decades, he
refused to submit to Faisal's rule. The lands that his tribes and flocks
roamed were not Iraq, he claimed, but Arabia, and his own.
All other methods failing, the British decided to carve a kingdom for
Ibn Saud out of Transjordan and Iraq. The following passage describing
how the deal was made is worth quoting at length. It is Wallach's
description of the birth of the modern Middle East, with hints of how
things could have been:
"Ibn Saud's slaves prepared for (Cox's) arrival. Lavish white tents
of various sizes were pitched in the sand for sleeping, bathing, dining
and entertaining; thick carpets were laid, luxurious furnishings
installed and ample supplies of fresh fruits, Perrier water, Cuban
cigars and Johnny Walker Scotch were stocked for (Cox.)
"The negotiations over the boundary lines went on for five days and
nights while Cox, dressed in his suit, bow tie and felt fedora, served
as a mediator between the robed representatives of Iraq, Kuwait and
Arabia. Ibn Saud demanded that the borders be based on tribes, not
territory, and according to his scheme, two groups — Fahad Bey's Anazeh
and part of the Shammar — would belong to Arabia, regardless of how far
north they traveled. The two tribes would become a movable border,
expanding and contracting, adjusting as they searched for grazing
grounds; the border would change according to their nomadic needs. "East
is East and West is West," Kipling had written, and the two were never
farther apart. To Cox and the British, the notion of property revolved
around territory, but for Ibn Saud and the Bedouin, the idea of property
was tied to people.
"No progress could possibly be made, and by the sixth day Sir Percy
lost his temper. With only Major Dixon at the meeting, he berated Ibn
Saud as if he were a schoolboy. At the rate both sides were going, he
told the perfumed Arabian ruler, nothing would be settled for a year.
Ibn Saud was on the verge of tears; Sir Percy Cox was his father and
mother, he cried, the one who had made him and raised him from nothing
to the position he held. He would surrender "half his kingdom, nay the
whole, if Sir Percy ordered."
With that, Sir Percy took hold of the map. Carefully drawing a red
line across the face of it, he assigned a chunk of the Nejd to Iraq;
then to placate Ibn Saud, he took almost two thirds of the territory of
Kuwait and gave it to Arabia. Last, drawing two zones, and declaring
that they should be neutral, he called one the Kuwait neutral zone and
the other the Iraq neutral zone. When a representative of Ibn Saud
pressed Cox not to make a Kuwait neutral zone, Sir Percy asked him why.
"Quite candidly," the man answered, "because we think oil exists there."
"That," replied the High Commissioner, "is exactly why I have made it a
neutral zone. Each side shall have a half-share." The agreement, signed
by all three sides at the beginning of December 1922, confirmed the
boundary lines drawn so carefully by Gertrude Bell. But for seventy
years, up until and including the 1990 Gulf War involving Iraq and
Kuwait, the dispute over the borders would continue."
* * *
With the creation of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq, the map of the
modern Middle East was complete. The British managed to keep their royal
surrogates in Iraq until 1958, when military officers shot the young
king (Faisal's grandson), his regent and prime minister.
Gertrude Bell stayed on in Iraq, though her influence waned. Faisal,
once he settled into power, needed his motherly British advisor less.
Gertrude Bell's main project became the archeological collection that
formed the core of the Baghdad Museum. She also took an interest in
women's schooling and, before the sanctions and war of the past two
decades, Iraqi women indeed had relatively great power and independence
within the Muslim world, based largely on education. Of course now,
under America's reign of light, both the museum and women's economic
position are trashed.
Gertrude Bell died in May of 1924 at the age of 58. Her achievements
were already, literally, written in stone. But she died outside the glow
of power, using an extra dose of sleeping pills, Wallach writes, "to
wipe away the dreary future."
One thing the British were never able to do is to inspire in the mass
of Iraqis the vision of a western style democracy for their country. Now
America seems to be failing at the same thing, and many Americans ask
why.
Perhaps for an answer we should look homeward.
Plenty Coup was a Crow Indian chief. His people, like Iraqis today,
were impoverished in their own land and ravaged by war because they
stood between Western expansion and the prime resources of the day.
Plenty Coup talked about a different war, in a different time. Yet his
words resonate. In many ways it has been the same war for all these
years:
The Americans, he said, "spoke very loudly when they said their laws
were made for everybody, but we soon learned that although they expected
us to keep them, they thought nothing of breaking them themselves. They
told us not to drink whisky, yet they made it themselves and traded it
to us for furs and robes until both were nearly gone. Their Wise Ones
said we might have their religion, but when we tried to understand it we
found that there were too many kinds of religion to understand, and that
scarcely any two white men agreed which was the right one to learn. This
bothered us a good deal until we saw that the white man did not take his
religion any more seriously than he did his laws, and that he kept both
of them just behind him, like Helpers, to use when they might do him
good in his dealings with strangers. These were not our ways. We kept
the laws we made and lived our religion. We have never been able to
understand the white man, who fools nobody but himself."
(This article is based almost completely on Desert Queen: The
Extraordinary Life of Gertrude Bell, Adventurer, Advisor to Kings, Ally
of Lawrence of Arabia, by Janet Wallach, Random House, 1996.)
 |
|
U.S. 2002
Pre-invasion Plan to Divide Iraq Into Three Separate States
|
|

Tuesday, April 11, 2006
 |
ProFutures - By Gary D. Halbert
 |
U.S. Considers Dividing Iraq Into Three Separate States After Saddam Is
Gone
October 1, 2002
1. Stratfor's Latest Intelligence On Iraq.
2. Iraq Is Too Big For One New Government.
3. US Would Divide Into Three Separate States.
4. Central Iraq (Sunnis) Would Join With Jordan
5. The Shia Region Would Join With Kuwait.
6. The Kurds Get Their Own State In The North.
7. Iraq Ceases To Exist; Baghdad No Longer Capital.
8. Investment Market Implications.
A US war against Iraq appears to be only a matter of when, not if,
despite the latest rumblings from a few high-level Democrats who oppose
the idea. The latest Zogby poll shows that 70% of Americans believe that
Saddam Hussein is a legitimate threat to the safety and security of the
United States, compared to 25% who believe Hussein is just another ruler
whose policies are anti-American. Most Americans also have little doubt
that we will win a war with Iraq handily, complete with the removal of
Saddam Hussein.
But the question I have been most interested in is whether there is any
group in Iraq that can successfully manage and govern that country after
Saddam and his thugs are removed from power. It would be a terrible
mistake for the US to clean out Saddam & Company, only to see the
country fall back into the hands of tyrants, especially religious
extremists who are sympathetic to al Qaeda, in another year or two.
Most observers agree that there is no one group in Iraq who could
successfully govern and manage it in the post-Saddam era, given its
diverse population and different religions. Given that, what are the US
and our allies to do?
Well, my good friends at STRATFOR.COM released a fascinating report last
Friday. Stratfor.com is one of the most respected geopolitical
intelligence services in the world. Stratfor's high-level sources tell
them that one of the leading long-term strategies being considered by US
war planners is one that will DIVIDE Iraq into three separate regions.
Under this plan Iraq would CEASE TO EXIST.
Stratfor believes the plan would divide Iraq as follows:
The central and largest part of Iraq that is populated by the Sunni
Arabs would be joined with JORDAN to form one "United Hashemite Kingdom,"
which would be ruled by Jordan's King Abdullah. This area would include
Baghdad, which would no longer be the capital.
The Kurdish region of northern and northwestern Iraq, including Mosul
and the vast Kirkuk oilfields, would become its own autonomous state.
The Shia Region in southwestern Iraq, including Basra, would make up the
third state, or more likely it would be joined with Kuwait.
Stratfor's sources indicate that the plan to divide (and thus eliminate)
Iraq as described above is not the only plan under consideration, and it
is also not finalized. However, such a plan makes a lot of sense to me.
Stratfor says that such a plan reportedly was discussed at an unusual
meeting between Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan and pro-US Iraqi Sunni
opposition members in London in July. Further, they say that in
September, the Israeli newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth, stated that the US
goal in Iraq was to create a United Hashemite Kingdom that would
encompass Jordan and Iraq's Sunni areas. Also, Israeli terrorism expert
Ehud Sprinzak recently echoed this sentiment on Russian television on
September 24.
So whose idea is this? According to Stratfor, Sprinzak stated that the
authors of the "Hashemite" plan are Vice President Dick Cheney and
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, both considered the most
hawkish of Bush administration officials. That is not surprising.
Why Such A Plan Might Make Sense
As noted above, the Bush administration may be considering the proposal
because the current goal of replacing Saddam Hussein with a pro-US Iraqi
government still would not guarantee long-term democratic stability over
the territory and its oil. It may become too hard for a new government
in Baghdad to effectively control the whole country, even with US troop
support. An example is Afghanistan, in which the government of President
Hamid Karzai still controls only the capital. Stratfor offers the
following analysis:
"The new government's attempts to establish control over all of Iraq may
well lead to a civil war between Sunni, Shia and Kurdish ethnic groups,
with US troops caught in the middle. The fiercest fighting could be
expected for control over the oil facilities. But uniting Jordan and
Iraq under a Hashemite government may give Washington several strategic
advantages.
First, the creation of a new pro-US kingdom under the half-British
Abdullah [king of Jordan] would shift the balance of forces in the
region heavily in the US favor. After eliminating Iraq as a sovereign
state, there would be no fear that one day an anti-American government
would come to power in Baghdad, as the capital would be in Amman [Jordan].
Current and potential US geopolitical foes Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria
would be isolated from each other, with big chunks of land between them
under control of the pro-US forces.
Equally important, Washington would be able to justify its long-term and
heavy military presence in the region as necessary for the defense of a
young new state asking for US protection -- and to secure the stability
of oil markets and supplies. That in turn would help the United States
gain direct control of Iraqi oil and replace Saudi oil in case of
conflict with Riyadh."
Benefits To The US
According to Stratfor's sources and the Israeli media, the richest oil
areas would go not to the Hashemite kingdom but to the autonomous
Kurdish region in the north. To make sure the new Kurdish state is not
seen as a threat to Turkey, our ally, the US would deploy armed forces
and build new military bases in the area, not only to prevent any
hostilities along the border, but also to insure the free flow of oil
from this area.
As a part of this plan, it is believed that the Bush administration
would also negotiate new deals to build US military bases in the
Hashemite kingdom and in the Shia Region to the south. This would be a
huge development in the War On Terror. With US military bases in the
three new states, the US would be in an ideal position should it choose
in the future to go after Iran, Saudi Arabia or other states in the
region that are supporting terrorism.
With Iraq divided as described above, with US aid and military
assistance, and not to mention, huge oil revenues going into government
coffers (as opposed to Saddam's pocketbook), this region could become
very prosperous very quickly.
Benefits For Israel And Jordan
Stratfor suggests that the division of Iraq, as described above, will
reap big benefits for both Israel and Jordan. Iraq, arguably Israel's
most determined enemy, would be eliminated. The end of Saddam's regime
would also deprive the Palestinians of much financial and other
assistance, which could reduce the effectiveness of their attacks
against the Jewish state.
King Abdullah of Jordan would vastly expand his role and prominence in
the region with a joint Hashemite state, becoming the second-most
important US ally in the region after Israel. In addition to his huge
territorial gains, he also would get a chunk of Iraqi oil. And
Palestinians, who currently make up half of Jordan's population, would
become a minority in the new state, with much less potential to stir up
trouble.
Difficult, But Not Impossible
Stratfor is quick to admit that the division plan above may not be the
final strategy. Others are on the table as well. Stratfor also
acknowledges that the plan will be difficult to achieve, and there are
obviously some risks. Certainly, it will be difficult to get the various
factions in Iraq to agree to the new arrangement. Obviously, Saudi
Arabia and Iran, and perhaps others in the region, will have major
heartburn over such a plan. Stratfor cautions that even Turkey could
have a problem with this plan. In addition, Stratfor says:
"The plan may not be free of negative consequences for Washington,
however. Iraq's Shia majority -- whose anti-Hussein opposition seems
currently divided between the United States and Iran -- probably would
not agree to become a part of the new kingdom. Iran may interfere by
urging Iraqi Shias to join with Tehran. Washington might counter by
agreeing to attach the Shia Iraqi region to Kuwait, Israeli media
speculates. Turkey, despite a U.S. military presence in Kurdish areas,
still might have reservations about the plan. Finally, it is unclear how
Sunni tribal and other leaders inside Iraq would react."
Conclusions
As noted at the beginning, I believe a plan that involves splitting Iraq
into separate entities is a very good idea. Assuming Saddam's regime is
toppled, it will still be very difficult, if not impossible, for any one
faction to control the entire country. If the plan includes provisions
for permanent US military facilities in the new states, that will make
the prosecution of the War On Terror much easier.
There are certainly arguments against a permanent US military presence
in the region. Some will argue that we are setting ourselves up for
another Vietnam-like conflict that could last many years. And there will
be plenty of other negatives voiced if this plan is actually adopted.
Yet in the end, some type of plan that splits Iraq and eliminates
Baghdad as the capital may be the best long-term solution, as Stratfor
suggests. |

It’s time to partition Iraq
Sunday, March 26, 2006
Tribune-Review - Bill Steigerwald
Turn the channel. Except for the final score, the war in Iraq is over.
We played hard and did many good things. But we had a lousy game plan and
really bad coaches. We lost.
After three years, the grand illusions the Bush administration foolishly
took us to war for -- to free Iraq, to defeat the terrorists in their own
backyard, to seed democracy in the Middle East, whatever -- are less
attainable than ever.
The bloody sectarian and ethnic violence of the last few weeks may or may
not signal the start of the oft-predicted civil war between the Kurds,
Sunnis and Shiites. But some experts say the violent unraveling of Iraq --
plus the inability or unwillingness of its new leaders to create a working
central government -- are signs that the nation of Iraq is breaking apart.
That's the last thing the Bush administration wants. It's still stubbornly
wedded to its original, unrealistic idea of re-creating a strong national
government in Baghdad that can keep the three factions happy and from
cutting each others' throats every other holy day.
But Peter Galbraith, a former ambassador to Croatia, and Ivan Eland, a
senior fellow at the libertarian Independent Institute, have a better
idea: They both think the best way to "rebuild" a better post-Saddam Iraq
always was, and still is, to partition it.
Galbraith, betraying his Democrat genes, calls his plan "a managed
breakup." But he and Eland both advocate decentralizing government power
in Iraq, an artificial country whose borders and Sunni-dominated power
structure were created after World War I by British diplomats.
The more you know about Iraq's history, people and geography, and the more
you talk to Galbraith and Eland, the more sense partition makes.
Iraq is similar to the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union,
which Galbraith says were both "killed by democracy." Partitioning Iraq --
i.e., allowing its major ethnic and religious groups to set up and rule
their own turf -- would create many messy political, economic and security
problems. Who gets how much oil revenue is the big one.
The U.S.-leaning Kurds up north and the Iran-leaning Shia down south favor
a breakup, Eland says. The Sunnis (Saddam's home tribe, centered around
Baghdad) are against it. But if the Sunni get a cut of the oil wealth,
Eland suspects they'll play along. Meanwhile, what all three groups fear
equally, he says, is a central government with a strong military that can
be seized by a future Saddam and used to oppress them.
A breakup of Iraq is inevitable, Galbraith and Eland both agree, so why
fight it? As Galbraith says, "If we seek to maintain an unitary Iraq, we
will commit ourselves to an endless occupation of the country and we're
not likely to succeed."
Unfortunately, neither Galbraith nor Eland sees any interest for a
partition inside the Bush administration. Eland thinks Washington is still
pushing a unified Iraq in part because of the president's unwillingness to
give up the idea of having permanent military bases there.
What the Bush administration wants or hopes for in Iraq has been moot for
a long time, however. Partition will happen eventually anyway -- violently
or peacefully. The best thing for us to do now to salvage our blunder in
Iraq, Eland says, is help the breakup process and work for a peaceful and
stable Iraq, not thwart it.
Then, Eland says, we could tell the Iraqis: "We've toppled Saddam. We've
helped you mediate this settlement. We've provided incentives for various
groups to do things. And now we're saying goodbye."
The Interview
Ivan Eland: It's time to partition Iraq
By Bill Steigerwald
27/03/2006
Why does Iraq -- an artificial country invented by British diplomats after
World War I and composed of three religious and ethnic groups that pretty
much hate each other -- have to have a unified national government? Why
not let Iraq do what Czechoslovakia and most of the Soviet Union did in
the 1990s -- carefully and peacefully partition itself? Why can't the
Kurds have their own democracy, the Shiites their own religious theocracy,
and the Sunnis their own strongman, if that's what they choose?
Ivan Eland is author of "The Empire Has No Clothes: U.S. Foreign Policy
Exposed" and director of the libertarian Independent Institute's Center on
Peace & Liberty. A longtime advocate of partitioning Iraq, he argues it's
the best and probably only way to avert the bloody civil war he says is
just getting started. I talked to him Wednesday by phone from his offices
in Washington.
Q: How do you define a partition of Iraq?
A: My observation is that Iraq is already partitioned. You have all these
militias running around with guns and the U.S. hasn't disarmed many of
them because they are helping with local security. But the problem is that
this thing has turned into "sectarian violence," as the president likes to
call it, or "civil war," as other people like to call it. What they need
to do is have a conclave and manage the partition of the country. Iraq is
going to break up because it already is broken up, and it can either be
done on a peaceful basis or one that is very nasty and violent. I think a
"managed partition" is the best way.
Q: Are we talking about breaking Iraq into three parts -- for Kurds,
Shiites and Sunnis?
A: Not necessarily. I don't think it's going to be that easy. What's going
to happen is that they are probably going to have a bloody civil war. It'll
be wherever the armies are. If one beats up on the other one, then the
boundaries will be changed. When you have a war, it's hard to determine
what will happen. A peaceful partition would probably be three or more
parts.
Q: Can this partition be imposed on Iraq by the United States?
A: No, I don't think so. You have to let them sort it out. They should
have done this before. It may be too late now, but it's still the best
hope for the place. The Kurds and the Shia don't really want to be a part
of Iraq. When you have 80 percent of the population that doesn't want to
be in the country, that's a problem. The Sunnis are the only ones who
don't want to break up the country. The main reason is that they think
they will be a rump state with no oil. If the Shia and the Kurds give the
Sunnis some oil, they will be willing to go their own way, too.
Q: What's the principle behind the partition -- decentralizing power and
local autonomy?
A: Yes. Decentralization. The main fear of each group, the reason the
Kurds and Shia want their autonomy and the reason the Sunni are fighting
an insurgency, is that each group fears that the central government will
be used to oppress the other group. So they either want control of the
central government, or if they can't get that, they want to be removed
from it.
Q: What are the upsides of a partition for the U.S.?
A: If every group were confined to its local areas and they all knew what
the boundaries were, and they would police people of their own ethnic or
religious group, then it might reduce the chances of civil war. And of
course then the al-Qaida terrorists would be the outcasts. If they were
still bombing, even in the Sunni areas, the Sunni militias would turn
against them because they are outsiders. I think you could actually reduce
Iraq as a haven for al-Qaida, as well, because the security would be
increased. This also provides the Bush administration with a way of
saying, "Well, we toppled Saddam Hussein and we gave the Iraqis the best
change for peace and prosperity." If there is peace in Iraq, people aren't
going to care if there's one Iraq or three or four Iraqs.
Q: Would we, the United States, play a role in the partition?
A: I think we can mediate it, but I think it must be done fairly quickly.
We see these negotiations dragging on now because nobody has an incentive.
Negotiations can happen real fast if there's an urgent need. If the U.S.
declares it's going to pull out, I think you will see the Kurds and the
Shia become very receptive to negotiating a settlement.
Q: Is there any interest in the Bush administration for a partition?
A: I don't know. I think they would do this only as a desperation move.
The problem is, if they wait too long, even a partition isn't going to
work because the civil war is already started. Unless they stop it, it's
going to get worse.
Q: Why is the Bush administration wedded to re-creating a strong central
government?
A: The president is still holding on to the idea that we're still going to
have military bases there. They want them on the Gulf, but the Shia areas
are not going to allow that, and they're the ones closest to the Gulf, and
that's where the significant amounts of oil are. I think that's one reason
the administration is still clinging to the idea of a unified Iraq. The
other is just probably bureaucratic inertia.
Q: What's Iraq going to look like in 2008? President Bush said our troops
will still be there.
A: I liken it to the pilot with two engines on fire who does not look for
an alternate landing strip but tries to continue on his course to his
original destination. He's probably going to crash and burn, and I think
that's what's going to happen in Iraq. I don't think we're going to make
it for another three years there. I think there's going to be a civil war
in Iraq if the president doesn't change course. The public won't stand for
U.S. forces being caught in a civil war. If all hell breaks loose in Iraq,
those forces will be coming home much, much sooner -- to the electoral
peril of Republicans. I don't think they have another three years to wait.
Bill Steigerwald is a columnist at the Pittsburgh
Tribune- Review.